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Public knowledge of rights has been the subject of a number of empirical enquiries over
the last decade. In England and Wales, knowledge of rights and its relationship with an
individual’s capacity to ‘self-help’ and ‘self-represent’ when faced with a civil justice
problem has become the subject of renewed attention following changes to legal aid
which, from March 2013, will see the availability of legal advice and representation
dramatically reduced. Previous studies focusing on public knowledge of rights in this
(and other) jurisdictions have illustrated a lack of knowledge amongst the general
population and more specifically, a widespread tendency of individuals to assume that
the law aligns with their own moral, ethical or social attitudes. However, many of these
studies have also suffered from methodological shortcomings. In attempting to address
some of these shortcomings this study uses an open-ended format to ask individuals
with one or one or more civil or social justice problems to describe their rights/legal
position. We find that whilst an open-ended question approach to exploring knowledge
of rights yields insight not acquired by other formats, its utility is constrained by
difficulty reconciling articulation and actual knowledge of rights. We discuss the
implications of these findings as they relate to the development of future research in the
field of family and social welfare law, Public Legal Education (PLE) and access to
justice post-March 2013.
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Introduction
In 2010 the British Government proposed wide-ranging reforms to the legal aid system
in England and Wales (Ministry of Justice 2011). They noted that although ‘successive
changes (had) managed to contain the growth in overall spending on legal aid, such
changes (had) not addressed the underlying problems facing the scheme’ (Ministry of
Justice 2010b, p. 3). In the long term, the Government agreed that simplification of the
justice system to make its navigation easier for lay individuals was necessary; in the
meantime, the availability of publicly funded specialist advice and representation across
a range of matter types would be substantially curtailed (Ministry of Justice 2010a,
2010b, 2011). Deciding which areas of law would and would not qualify for publicly
funded legal advice and assistance under the new legal aid scheme was justified in part,
by reference to whether the public could utilise (self-help and) self-representation for
their particular problem (Ministry of Justice 2010a, 2010b, 2011).1 Consequently, the
reforms heralded by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act
(LASPO) 2012, detailed (explicitly and implicitly) that self-help/self-representation
would from April 2013 onwards, become a key route to resolving civil justice
problems.2
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Public legal capability, education and knowledge of rights
The idea that individuals are capable of handling civil justice problems without
professional advice, anticipates a level of existing competence from the population –
particularly those individuals who are neither eligible for legal aid, nor able to secure
alternative legal services. How public legal capability is assessed and improved, or for that
matter, the characteristics necessary to produce individual legal ‘capability’ remains an
issue of some debate. One factor generally considered relevant, is the extent to which
individuals know their legal rights (see, e.g., PLEAS Taskforce 2007, Gramatikov and
Porter 2010, Buck et al., 2008, Balmer et al., 2010, Bowal 1999). It is argued that without
such knowledge, individuals will more often fail to vindicate their rights (Bowal 1999);
fail to take steps to protect themselves against the likelihood of a particular eventuality
(Kim 1999, Meager et al., 2002); fail to uphold their civic responsibilities (Bowal 1999);
and experience diminished success when self-representing in court (Moorhead and Sefton
2005). A lack of knowledge has also been said to potentially generate unrealistic
expectations of lawyers and judges (Bowal 1999) and the risk of experiencing a civil
justice problem (Williams 2009) and is further linked with the adoption of poor problem
handling techniques and lower levels of satisfaction with outcome when an individual
seeks to handle their problem alone (Buck et al., 2008, Balmer et al., 2010, Denvir et al.,
2012).
In the Public Bill Committee debates regarding the passage of the LASPO Bill, it was
said that changes to legal aid demanded greater public knowledge of rights if individuals
were to be expected to self-help and self-represent more often (Public Bill Committee
2011). It follows, then, that as part of an on-going effort to safeguard access to justice,
whether the general public have knowledge of their rights or not will remain one of the key
issues facing public policy makers in the years to come. Studies which have previously
sought to measure knowledge of rights have found that citizens in a number of
jurisdictions frequently admit to lacking knowledge (see, e.g., Cortese 1966, Williams and
Hall 1972, Saunders 1975, Baker and Emery 1993, Parle/IARS 2009, Casebourne et al.
2006; Genn et al., 2006, Tennant et al. 2006, Albrecht and Green 1977) with this lack of
knowledge more prominent among certain subsections of the population, namely young
people, the mentally ill, and those without educational qualifications (see, e.g., Williams
and Hall 1972, Ruck et al., 1998, Youth Access 2002, Parle/IARS, 2009, Casebourne et al.
2006, Buck et al., 2008, Denvir et al., 2012). These concerns have been the basis for a
range of policy initiatives aimed at improving public knowledge of rights, referred to as
‘Public Legal Education’ (PLE) (PLEAS Taskforce, 2007).3 Such interventions seek to
rectify an absence of knowledge, and thus require an understanding of the existing level of
knowledge amongst the general population. Yet measuring public knowledge of rights or
for that matter the benefits that may flow from increased knowledge is no easy feat, as
existing research in the field has illustrated.
Measuring knowledge of rights
Self-reporting knowledge
Existing studies have generally taken one of two approaches in measuring public
knowledge of rights. The first approach, as used by both Denvir et al., (2012) and Buck
et al., (2008) has involved asking respondents to self-report the extent to which they know
their rights, with results highlighting low levels of knowledge amongst the general
population and certain groups. However, as recognised in the methodological literature
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(see, e.g., Baldwin 2009) whilst self-reporting is a convenient approach, it is not without
issues. These include the fact that long reference periods in any type of survey may impact
upon memory recall (Deming 1950, Bradburn et al., 1987), that respondents to face-to-
face surveys may be inclined to answer in certain ways (for a variety of reasons, see, e.g.,
Groves et al., 2009, Calahan 1968), and that the acquisition of knowledge after the event
may lead people to incorporate post-event information in their memory of the experience
(Groves et al., 2009). This last issue has particular relevance given that an individual’s
propensity to incorporate post-event information has ramifications for any attempt to link
the presence of knowledge with the problem-resolution strategies individuals adopt. More
problematic however, is the assumption that those who report knowing their ‘legal rights’
actually do. In the absence of an understanding of what respondents actually believe their
rights to be, Buck et al., (2008) and Denvir et al., (2012) may simply indicate an
individual’s level of confidence in their knowledge, especially given that existing research
also highlights individuals answer more confidently when asked fixed choice questions
(see, e.g., Schuman and Presser 1981, Schwarz and Hippler 1991).
Fact-based questions with/without a contextual hypothetical scenario or ‘vignette’
Studies which have attempted to verify the self-reporting of knowledge such as Meager
et al.’s (2000) employment rights research, have adopted a second approach. Using self-
assessment questions alongside a number of other question types, including (prompted and
unprompted) awareness of various employment related legislation, and questions which
ask whether a hypothetical situation represents a breach of the law alongside requiring
participants to name the law breached. Via these methods, Meager et al., (2002) were able
to demonstrate that although two-thirds of respondents to their study claimed to be well
informed or very well informed about their rights, substantive knowledge varied by
individual problem-type, with individuals often able to identify a breach of the law in a
hypothetical situation, but unable to substantiate this breach by naming the relevant
legislation.4 The authors concluded that individuals often identified breaches of the law
based on perceptions of fairness or natural justice, rather than knowledge of the relevant
legislation (Meager et al., 2002) suggesting that self-reporting remained a crude proxy for
actual knowledge.
Yet, whilst utilising a range of approaches, the authors failed to comment on the fact
that the ability to name legislation was not necessarily a good measure of knowledge of
rights or of the content of the legislation itself. By focusing more on whether respondents
were able to link what they perceived to be unfair behaviour with the corresponding
legislation, rather than exploring whether respondents actually understood their rights, the
results provided only limited insight into ‘knowledge of rights’. Similar such limitations
were evident in Kim’s earlier (1999) work exploring US employees’ knowledge of rights
regarding at-will-dismissal. Respondents were required to indicate whether they felt the
dismissal was lawful or unlawful in respect of a number of circumstances. But whilst
incorrect responses were said to indicate a confusion of legal norms and ethical or social
norms, correct responses were deemed to indicate ‘knowledge’ of rights, rather, than as
may well have been the case, a situation in which ethical/social norms and the law
happened to align (Kim 1999) or ‘educated’ or ‘wild’ guesses happened to be correct
(Nadaeu and Niemi 1995).5,6
A different approach to exploring public knowledge of rights (whilst retaining a fact-
based questioning approach) was utilised a few years later by Barlow et al. in 2005. With
the intent of exploring existing levels of knowledge among the general population as to the
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rights of a cohabitant vis a` vis the rights of a spouse,7 the authors developed a series of
fact-based questions relating to the legal rights of a protagonist in a hypothetical scenario
(or ‘vignette’) which were then added to the 2004 British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS).
Finding that individuals held erroneous beliefs in respect of time-dependent accrual of
benefits8 and a belief in the equivalence of paternal rights and responsibilities between
married and unmarried couples, Barlow et al. (2005, p. 45) concluded that people’s beliefs
about cohabitation law, whether accurate or not, were based less on acquired knowledge,
and more upon ‘notions of social logic, fairness and morality’.
Whilst findings corroborated those of other related studies (e.g. Meager et al., 2002,
Kim 1999) as Pleasence and Balmer (2012) observed, the BSAS questions relied on a
presumption that people had good knowledge of the spousal rights against which
cohabitants’ rights were being compared, resulting in conflation between knowledge of
spousal rights and knowledge of cohabiting rights. Thus, in their 2012 study on the same
topic using respondents to the English and Welsh Civil and Social Justice Panel Survey
(CSJPS), Pleasence and Balmer (2012) also developed a series of fact-based questions in
relation to a hypothetical scenario but randomly varied the duration of the relationship
(one month to 20 years – allowing formal modelling of time dependency in beliefs about
accrual of rights) and its status (cohabiting or married). Whilst employing a different
methodology, like Barlow et al., (2005), Pleasence and Balmer (2012) found evidence of
ongoing public misconception of cohabitation law, leading the authors to propose that in
the absence of an actual understanding of the law, the public tended to believe the law
aligned with the rights they thought it ought to protect.
Although Pleasence and Balmer (2012) were able to address some of the issues evident
in the ‘vignette’ approach taken by Barlow et al., (2005) this does not leave the approach
limitation-free. Other signs point to the fact that responses to hypothetical questions may,
like self-reporting, provide only a rough measure of knowledge for a number of reasons.
Nadaeu and Niemi (1995) note that some individuals, even when unsure of an answer, will
be compelled to respond in a manner other than ‘don’t know’ with some people inclined to
answer knowledge-based questions even in the face of considerable uncertainty (Chong
1993). For some, these uncertain answers are ‘educated guesses’, for others they may be
‘wild guesses’ (Nadaeu and Niemi 1995). In addition, it has been said that most people
‘construct’ attitudes when asked a question (Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988), meaning that
a respondent without actual knowledge may answer a fact-based question in manner no
different to how they would answer an attitudinal question; perhaps explaining why
previous research has found that individuals respond with answers indicative of what they
think the law should be, rather than what it actually is. The question that these issues
highlight, is whether there might be an alternative approach to exploring public knowledge
of rights, and if so, what form it would take?
Alternative approaches to exploring public knowledge of rights
In the exploration of public knowledge of rights, open-ended questions appear to have
remained if not unused, then seemingly unreported. This is somewhat surprising since as
Hruschka et al., (2004) and Geer (1988) note, the use of open-ended questions offers a
number of benefits, including capturing data of (potentially) greater accuracy or relevance
to the individual, alongside capturing unanticipated responses. What may offset these
benefits (and account for the lack of use to date) is as both Griffith et al. (1999) and
Johnson et al., (1974) note (although contested by Burchall and Marsh 1992) these benefits
may come at the expense of higher response rates, possibly because some individuals
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(more often those without educational qualifications according to Geer 1988) struggle to
articulate their responses.
However, neither of these suggested limitations would appear to outweigh the
potential insight open-ended questions might provide when used to explore how the public
defines and describes their rights. This is particularly so in respect of knowledge of the
law, since self-help and self-representation rely (to varying degrees) on an individual’s
ability to identify and articulate an infringement of their rights. In the context of wide-
ranging changes to public legal aid in England and Wales and a presumed increase in self-
help and self-representation (Public Bill Committee 2011), open-ended questions present a
fresh approach to the measurement of public knowledge of rights across a range of civil
and social justice issues.
Accordingly, in this study we explore how individuals with one or more civil or social
justice problems respond when asked to briefly describe their rights/legal position in the
context of a quantitative survey. Our findings contribute to the existing methodological
and PLE literature by: (a) examining the merits of using open-ended questions to explore
public knowledge of rights; and (b) exploring how the public articulate their rights when
asked to do so and what may be inferred about their level of knowledge. With the changes
contained in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO)
imminent, this study is particularly timely.
Aims and hypothesis
In this study, we draw on data from the 2010 English and Welsh Civil and Social Justice
Panel Survey (CSJPS) to build upon earlier studies exploring public knowledge of rights.
Utilising self-assessment and open-ended (verbatim) responses from the CSJPS, this study
sets out to determine: whether an open-ended question format can provide useful insight
into an individual’s knowledge of their rights and/or the validity of their self-assessment
and the extent to which findings might provide useful lessons for research and policy
development.
Referring to self-assessed knowledge of rights and on the basis of the issues raised in the
extant literature (including the findings of Williams and Hall 1972, Caseborne et al. 2006,
Genn et al., 2006, Tennant et al. 2006, Buck et al., 2008 and Denvir et al., 2012) we
hypothesise that the majority of those experiencing one or more civil or social justice
problems do not report having knowledge of their rights and that the majority report a
failure to acquire knowledge of their rights, but as found by Kim (1999) and Meager et al.,
(2002) these rates will vary by problem-type. Based on Deming’s (1950) concerns
regarding issues of memory recall in relation to self-assessed questions, we also hypothesise
that those who self-report report knowing their rights in Wave 1 of the CSJPS in respect of a
particular problem, frequently answer inconsistently when they are asked whether they
knew their rights in Wave 2 (in relation to the same problem). We further hypothesise that
many of the people who profess to have knowledge of rights are unable to articulate these
rights in response to the open-ended format, however unlike Geer (1988) we propose that
the failure to articulate knowledge of rights will not be associated with education level.
Methods
Data
Data used for this study came from the 2010 CSJPS,9 a nationally representative survey
of 3806 individuals aged 16 or over, living in 2318 households across 194 sample points
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in England and Wales. The survey explored respondents’ experience of, and response to
a broad range of problems involving legal rights. The survey was conducted face-to-face
in respondents’ homes, with all members of households interviewed separately. The
survey averaged 37 minutes, with a household response rate of 88% and a cumulative
eligible adult response rate of 54%. For further technical details of the CSJPS, see
Pleasence et al., (2011). Table 1 shows incidence of each of the broad problem types in
the survey
In addressing some of the limitations of earlier research, the 2010 CSJPS included a
series of open-ended questions, including questions designed to ascertain if individuals
knew their rights/legal position. It did so by asking individuals who reported one or more
civil or social justice problem the following: ‘Thinking about the time the problem first
started, to what extent did [you/your partner] understand [your/their] legal position - for
example, what [your/their] legal rights were?’ Which had a scale of answers as follows:
(1) completely; (2) mostly; (3) partly; (4) not at all; (5) don’t know. Those who answered
with (3), (4) or (5) were then asked ‘To what extent do [you/they] now understand what
[your/their] legal position was?’ This differed from the wording of the continuous Civil
and Social Justice Survey (upon which Buck et al., 2008 and Denvir et al., 2012 relied)
which asked ‘At the time of the [problem descriptor], did you know what your legal rights
were relating to this problem?’ with the intent of negating some of the memory recall
problems (Deming 1950, Groves 2009) mentioned above by distinguishing between those
who knew their rights from the offset and those who acquired knowledge. Those who
stated that they knew their rights at the start of the problem ‘completely’ or ‘mostly’ and
those who indicated that they now knew their rights ‘completely’ or ‘mostly’ were
additionally asked whether they ‘[could] describe, briefly, what [your/your partner’s] legal
position was?’
In Wave 2 of the CSJPS, all follow-up respondents were asked again ‘To what extent
do [you/they] now understand what [your/their] legal position was?’ in respect of the same
problem, with the same range of responses available (‘completely’, ‘mostly’, ‘partly’, ‘not
at all’, ‘don’t know’). This enabled the tracking of the self-assessment respondents gave,
across CSJPS waves. However, owing to timing restrictions, follow-up respondents in
Wave 2 were not asked to briefly describe their rights, so where an individual responded
Table 1. Prevalence of civil justice problems of different types.
Problem type N %
Neighbours 359 9.3
Consumer 338 8.9
Employment 211 5.5
Money 202 5.3
Debt 185 4.9
Benefits 166 4.4
Personal Injury 155 4.1
Rented housing 144 3.8
Relationship breakdown 80 2.1
Education 71 1.9
Owned housing 59 1.6
Clinical negligence 53 1.4
Divorce 41 1.1
Domestic violence 39 1.0
Care proceedings 9 0.2
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that they knew their rights ‘partly’, ‘not at all’ or ‘don’t know’ in Wave 1, but in Wave 2
indicated that they now knew their rights, the verbatim responses of these individuals were
not captured.
Analysis
Firstly we set out the extent to which respondents to the 2010 CSJPS (Wave 1) self-report
knowledge of rights and how this varies with problem-type so as to provide an overview of
the cohort and a basis for comparison with existing studies. We describe the rate at which
individuals knew their rights at the start of their problem and the rate at which individuals
acquired knowledge of their rights, distinguished by problem-type.
Exploring how self-reported knowledge changes over the course of the reference
period, using descriptive statistics, we compare individuals’ self-reported knowledge in
Wave 1, against their self-reported knowledge in Wave 2, looking also at the extent to
which knowledge varies by problem-type across Wave 1 and Wave 2 of the CSJPS.
Finally, we look at how individuals answered the open-ended question asking them to
describe their rights. We code these verbatim responses into one of seven categories as
outlined below. Whilst responses were not ‘marked’ as correct or incorrect, we anticipated
that those inferring the intended meaning from the question and capable of articulating
their legal position/rights, would provide an answer that gave insight into their position of
(legal) power relative to the other party. For example, someone who purchased a faulty
coat and reported a consumer problem could (in an ideal scenario) answer the question as
follows: (a) ‘under the Sale of Goods Act I was allowed to claim a refund or exchange on
my faulty coat’. Those without knowledge of or reference to the legislation might have
offered a similar explanation such as: (b) ‘the store had to provide me with a refund or
exchange’. In consideration of the fact that in the context of a long quantitative survey
some participants might have (reasonably) opted to explain their legal position with
greater brevity (see further Herzog and Bachman 1981), we could also have expected
answers such as (c) ‘I could get a refund’ which although shorter, remained illustrative of
an individual’s knowledge of their rights/legal position.
Whilst the range of expected answers was rather broad, individuals actually answered
in a far more varied manner than this. Analysis of all verbatim responses identified seven
different responses types that individuals tended towards in answering the question. These
categories included:
(1) Those who described their situation or the outcome they experienced (e.g. ‘My
zipper was broken on my coat’ or ‘The shop offered a refund’);
(2) Those who referred to legislation, used legal terminology, spoke of ‘positive’
rights, or provided a common sense interpretation of their rights (e.g. see (a), (b)
and (c) above);
(3) Those who referred to legislation, used legal terminology, or spoke of ‘positive’
rights but whose response indicated that they may have misinterpreted their legal
position, or over/underestimated their rights (e.g. an example of an overestimate of
rights might have included: ‘Under the Sale of Goods Act my rights were to get a
new coat and the shop had to replace it with a better quality brand than previously
and compensate me for inconvenience caused’. Whereas an underestimation of
rights might have been: ‘I was entitled to a refund or return but it was the
manufacturer I needed to contact not the store’);
(4) Those who made a value judgement about the fairness of the legal system, the
individuals involved, or their position in it (e.g. ‘I was right, the coat was faulty’ or
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‘No point in complaining, the Government is acting to take away the rights of
consumers’);
(5) Those who referred to broad rights that did not suggest any knowledge of their
rights in relation to their problem, but were indicative of a more general
understanding of the legal system or with moral or ethical interpretations of the
concept ‘right’ (e.g. ‘Human Rights’, ‘The right to voice my opinion’, ‘I could
appeal’, ‘I had the right to be listened to’);
(6) Those who claimed to have no legal position/rights or to be ‘in the wrong ’ (e.g.
‘No rights’, ‘I should have noticed the zip was broken before I took the coat home,
it was my fault I didn’t check’);
(7) Those who claimed not to know, or who failed to articulate anything.
Whilst the answers provided were for the most part discrete, where an individual
provided a response that could have fallen into two categories, they were assigned to a
category based on the length of their answer.10 This was not the case where an individual
provided a response that may have fallen into category (2) and another category, they were
coded only as (2) since the central issue was whether they could explain their
legal/position rights, and not the information they provided surplus to this.
In exploring open-ended responses, we compare verbatim response-type against
problem type, looking also at how individuals verbalised their rights, before turning to
explore whether response and articulation type varied by level of educational attainment.
Results
Perceived knowledge and the acquisition of perceived knowledge of rights
Out of 1760 problems, respondents said they knew their rights at the outset of the problem,
‘completely’ for 396 problems (22.5%), ‘mostly’ for 319 problems (18.1%), ‘partly’ for
356 problems (20.2%), ‘not at all’ for 612 problems (34.8%). For a further 68 problems
(3.9%)11 respondents suggested that they did not know whether or not they knew their
rights. For those 1036 problems where the respondent answered ‘partly’, ‘not at all’ or
‘don’t know’, they were additionally asked whether they later came to understand their
rights. For 140 problems (13.6%) respondents claimed to have acquired knowledge of
their rights ‘completely’ in relation to the problem, for 205 problems respondents acquired
knowledge of their rights ‘mostly’ (19.9%), ‘partially’ for 345 problems (33.5%), for 289
problems (28.1%) respondents claimed still to have obtained no knowledge and for 51
problems respondents claimed not to know (5%).
In total, discounting those who provided no response, for 715 problems (41%)
respondents claimed to know their rights completely or mostly at the start of the problem.
For a further 345 problems (20%) respondents came to acquire knowledge of their rights,
and for 685 problems (39%), respondents did not come to acquire knowledge of their
rights. Table 2 identifies these individuals on the basis of problem type.
As is shown in Table 2, those with consumer problems more often knew their rights
from the outset at 58.4% but were relatively less likely to acquire knowledge of their
rights, followed by owned housing at 49.1% where the acquisition of knowledge was
higher than non-acquisition. In domestic violence cases the acquisition of knowledge was
higher than its rate at the outset, but those with domestic violence problems were more
likely still, to not acquire knowledge at all, at a rate of 37.8%. A failure to acquire
knowledge was particularly prevalent for care proceedings, clinical negligence, education
and neighbours cases.12
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Self-reported knowledge across CSJPS waves
Owing to the panel format of the CSJPS, individuals at Wave 1 were asked whether they
knew their rights at the start of the problem or whether they later came to acquire
knowledge. In Wave 2, follow-up respondents (i.e. the same respondents as Wave 1) were
again asked whether they ‘now knew’ their rights in relation to the same problem, allowing
an exploration of whether respondents changed their self-assessment over time. Results
found that 92 respondents (24.6%) claimed to have lost knowledge – that is to say they
reported knowing their rights to a higher degree in Wave 1, than they did in Wave 2. 135
respondents (36.1%) claimed the same level of knowledge, and 147 respondents (39.3%)
claimed to have gained knowledge. Table 3 displays the rate at which knowledge was lost,
gained or remained the same by problem type.
As is shown in Table 3, those with neighbours (51.3%), personal injury (50%),
employment (45.7%), clinical negligence (45.5%), and education (45.5%) problems were
more likely to report gains in knowledge than those with other problem types. Those with
owned housing (71.4%) and consumer (58.8%) were most likely to report the same level of
knowledge across waves, with those with rented housing and personal injury problems
reporting a loss in knowledge more frequently than other problems types. However, at a
rate of 34.6% for rented housing and 33.3% for personal injury, approximately two-thirds
of individuals with these sorts of problems reported the same, or a gain in knowledge. For
all problem types, more individuals reported either gaining or retaining the same level of
knowledge than reported losing knowledge.
Open-ended articulation of rights
For the 1056 problems where individuals claimed to know their legal position/rights
‘completely’ or ‘mostly’ at either the outset of the problem or later during the course of the
problem, individuals were asked to briefly explain their legal position/legal rights.
Analysis of the responses revealed some common themes categorised as described
previously.
Table 2. Problem types and knowledge of rights.
Knew rights at
outset
Acquired
knowledge
Did not acquire
knowledge
Problem type N Row % N Row % N Row %
Consumer 174 58.4 38 12.8 86 28.9
Employment 69 35.0 47 23.9 81 41.1
Neighbours 103 40.9 33 13.1 116 46.0
Owned housing 26 49.1 15 28.3 12 22.6
Rented housing 41 34.5 24 20.2 54 45.4
Debt 61 36.1 39 23.1 69 40.8
Money 72 39.3 38 20.8 73 39.9
Benefits 43 33.0 28 21.7 58 45.0
Education 22 33.8 11 16.9 32 49.2
Personal injury 29 42.6 17 25.0 22 32.4
Clinical negligence 19 39.6 5 10.4 24 50.0
Divorce/relationship breakdown 44 37.0 35 29.4 40 33.6
Domestic violence 10 27.0 13 35.1 14 37.8
Care proceedings 2 25.0 2 25.0 4 50.0
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Table 4 examines the categorisation of verbatim responses in relation to problem-type.
As can be seen, 25.9% of verbatim responses were categorised as instances where the
respondent described the situation or outcome of the dispute. Forty-two per cent of
respondents detailed their legal position/rights referring to the legislation, legal
terminology or presenting a lay interpretation and fewer (8%) individuals provided a
more general/vague interpretation of their rights. Less frequently, individuals gave
responses which suggested they may have under or overestimated their rights or the
strength of their legal position at a rate of 2.6%, with 4.5% claiming that they had no rights
in respect of their problem or that their ‘legal’ position was that they were to blame or at
fault. 6.1% made a value judgement about the legal system in response to the question,
with a further 11.1% claiming that they did not know or could not verbalise their
rights/legal position when asked.
Setting aside the categorisation of verbatim responses related to care proceedings
given the small numbers contained within that group (four in total) results further highlight
how individuals with certain problems tended to reply in certain ways. This was not so
evident in respect of those who responded to the open-ended question in a manner that
described their situation or outcome. Here, relatively high rates of responding in this
manner were seen across most problem types and differences were relatively small with
the exception of those with education problems (at 12.1%). Where respondents did
describe their situation or outcome, their answers provided relatively little if any insight in
to what they believed their rights to be, making it difficult to deduce whether they had any
clear understanding of their rights as they believed they did. Examples of those who
claimed they knew their legal position/rights included: ‘Took out a joint mortgage with a
friend who had unknown to me a poor credit rating’ and ‘The agency gave me a poor score
I had not done anything wrong they would not let me see my score in details’. Individuals
with debt problems frequently spoke of the nature of their problem, rather than articulating
what their legal entitlements were. Examples included one who simply stated that they
Table 3. Whether respondents lost, gained or retained the same level of knowledge of their rights
by problem-type.*
Lost Same Gained
N Row % N Row % N Row %
Consumer 6 17.6 20 58.8 8 23.5
Employment 10 21.7 15 32.6 21 45.7
Neighbours 20 25.6 18 23.1 40 51.3
Owned housing 1 7.1 10 71.4 3 21.4
Rented housing 9 34.6 10 38.5 7 26.9
Debt 9 21.4 17 40.5 16 38.1
Money 11 30.6 13 36.1 12 33.3
Benefits 5 23.8 8 38.1 8 38.1
Education 3 27.3 3 27.3 5 45.5
Personal injury 4 33.3 2 16.7 6 50.0
Clinical negligence 2 18.2 4 36.4 5 45.5
Divorce/relationship breakdown 10 31.3 10 31.3 12 37.5
Domestic violence 2 20 4 40 4 40.0
*With only one respondent the category ‘care’ was removed from the table, this respondent reported that their
knowledge had stayed the same.
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‘went over their overdraft’ and another who explained that ‘I gave girlfriend money to
look after she spent it all.’
In respect of those who did answer the question in the manner expected by describing
their rights/legal position, these types of responses were most common among those
experiencing domestic violence problems at a rate of 65%. Responses such as ‘I could get
him nicked’ or ‘I had the right to press charges’ were typical of domestic violence cases.
Those with consumer, rented housing, benefits, divorce/relationship breakdown, debt and
education problems also had high rates of providing answers that indicated that they had
an understanding of their legal position/rights at a rate of between 52–45%. However,
whilst responses were indicative of some level of knowledge, the extent to which
respondents were familiar with the legislation varied from individual to individual. For
example, some respondents provided relatively simplistic and short responses, such as
‘had to pay the money’. Whilst this response presents an efficient explanation in the
context of a long quantitative survey it is distinguished from those who demonstrated
willingness to provide a more detailed response, by stating their obligations, along with
their entitlements, e.g. ‘had to repay the money in affordable instalments’ or ‘I had to pay
the money back at a payment that was affordable to me and not what they were asking’.
Some individuals gave specific reference to the relevant legislation in their answers with
this more common in the case of those reporting clinical negligence or consumer
problems. For example, whilst some responses were again simplistic, e.g. ‘could get a
refund’, others were more sophisticated, e.g. ‘goods not sold as described so they did not
meet Sale of Goods Act’, with another detailing that they had a ‘right to receive goods fit
for purpose’. Although, individuals did not always recall the name of the legislation
correctly, for example, one respondent claimed to be ‘entitled to a replacement under the
(non-existent) faulty goods act’ this error did not compromise their understanding of their
rights - namely that they were entitled to a replacement.
Yet, although frequently reporting their rights/legal position as expected, those with
consumer problems along with those experiencing employment, rented housing and
education problems were also more frequently categorised as responding to the open-
ended question in a manner that indicated they may have erred in their understanding of
their rights, along with either potentially over or underestimating their entitlements (5.7%,
6%, 4.6%, 6.1% respectively). Generally, this overestimation appeared to derive from a
misunderstanding of the relevant legislation or its application. Some errors had the
potential to impact upon the resolution of the problem and an individual’s satisfaction with
this resolution. For example, one respondent claimed to have ‘had the right to (have his
vehicle repaired) to (his) satisfaction’ when in fact the relevant legislation (Sale of Goods
Act 1979) imposes an objective test of satisfactory quality (under s14 (2) and s48B as it
relates to repair) suggesting the individual may have been waiting for an outcome which
holds the other party to a higher standard than the legislation does. There also appeared to
be confusion surrounding tenancy rights, including one individual who erroneously
believed it was within their rights to ‘withdraw rent until (their) property (was) sorted’, a
position which is not only legally incorrect, but places the individual at risk of eviction.
Conversely, individuals also appeared to occasionally underestimate their rights, including
one individual who claimed that ‘if you order something and pay on the Internet and tick
the terms and conditions you have no rights’ a position at odds with the entitlements
enshrined in the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling Regulations) 2000 and potentially
also the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.13 There was indication of
potential underestimation of rights in respect of employment, with a number of individuals
claiming that they had to put up with changes to the terms and conditions of their
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employment or get another job. Whilst understanding that they did not have to agree to
such changes, they did not appear to have an appreciation of the fact that (legally speaking)
getting another job was not their only alternative.
Value judgements were most common amongst those with neighbours (12.5%) and
those with personal injury (19.6%) problems. Typically these were the types of problems
where individuals provided very matter-of-fact and short responses to the question asked by
detailing that they were ‘in the right’, ‘wholly innocent’ or ‘had done nothing wrong’.
Whilst these were legitimate responses to the question asked, particularly since the question
asked individuals to detail their ‘legal position’, they did not elicit the desired information,
namely greater insight into what people thought their rights were. It was also somewhat
surprising to find responses discussing issues such as guilt/innocence in relation to a civil,
rather than a criminal justice problem. However, this is perhaps less surprising given that
personal injury problems tend to focus on the attribution of blame and responsibility, whilst
neighbours problems can often straddle both the civil and criminal law.
In a similar vein, those with employment and education problems more frequently gave
answers indicative of them having ‘no rights’ with one individual claiming that they had no
rights because they ‘(could not) argue against council or government decision’. At a rate of
5.9% and 5.6% those with neighbours and benefits problems also expressed their belief that
they had ‘no rights’ when asked. However, whilst some appeared to be more of a political
statement than an expression of legal understanding, for example one individual in respect
of a benefit problem who claimed that the ‘government acting (was) to remove rights’,
other responses appeared illustrative, not of knowledge (or a lack thereof) but whether a
right could reasonably be upheld by the individual. For example, one respondent with a
neighbour problem claimed that ‘essentially we had little rights, collecting evidence would
be difficult and time consuming and we have to prove damage to property and then start
civil action’. Similar such statements were evident in relation to employment problems
where individuals often claimed that they had ‘no rights’, not because none existed, but
more often because they believed exercising such rights would put their job at risk.
Common sense interpretations of rights were most often given in respect of clinical
negligence, domestic violence, neighbours and owned housing. Examples included those
who identified a ‘right to take an individual to court’, ‘the right to an appeal’, ‘human
rights’, or the ‘right to be heard’ or ‘voice an opinion’. Whilst these responses were again,
not incorrect, they were indicative of a more general understanding of an individual’s
position based on common sense or principles of fairness, one not reliant on knowledge of
the law in relation to a particular problem. Of course many people may also have had
knowledge of the law in respect of the question asked –indeed one individual did make a
distinction between what she saw as legal and moral rights in stating in respect of her
employment problem that she ‘Did not have legal right to move but had moral rights not to
be moved further away from home’. However, because the rights these individuals
professed to have were so generic, it made it difficult to determine the extent to which
these individuals had any clear understanding of the specific rights relative to their legal
problem, or whether they were simply relying on a broad understanding of concepts of
‘natural justice’ or legal common sense.
Importantly, verbatim responses highlighted a disjuncture between an individual’s
belief that they knew their rights/legal position and their ability to articulate this. This was
more so the case for those reporting debt, benefits, education and owned housing problems
than those reporting other problem types. For 117 problems (11.1%) individuals responded
that they ‘(didn’t) know’ when asked to articulate their rights, suggesting that they were
confident enough to believe that their problem engaged a right but they could not explain
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this in legal terms. Indeed, one respondent said as much, claiming that they ‘(couldn’t)
really describe it’.
Education level and responses to the verbatim question
Table 5 shows the categorisation of verbatim responses in relation to the level of
educational attainment of the respondents. Whilst there are some minor differences
apparent in Table 5 as shown below, there was no significant relationship emerging
between type of verbatim response and level of education qualification. 14
Discussion
Our results indicate that most individuals felt unsure of their rights at the outset of their
problem. For 41% of problems, respondents claimed to know their rights completely or
mostly at the start of the problem, for a further 20% of problems respondents acquired
knowledge, and for 39% of problems respondents did not come to acquire knowledge.
Knowledge varied by problem type (see Table 2), with those with consumer problems
more often reporting knowledge of their rights from the outset at 58.4% but relatively less
likely to acquire knowledge of their rights, followed by owned housing at 49.1% where the
acquisition of knowledge was higher than non-acquisition. In domestic violence cases the
acquisition of knowledge was higher than its rate at the outset, but those with domestic
violence problems were more likely still, to not acquire knowledge at all, at a rate of
37.8%. A failure to acquire knowledge was particularly prevalent for clinical negligence,
education and neighbour problems.
Utilising data from both Waves of the CSJPS highlighted that 24.6% of respondents
claimed to lose knowledge with 39.3% claiming a gain in knowledge. As is shown in
Table 3, those with neighbours (45.7%), personal injury (50%), employment (45.7%),
clinical negligence (45.5%), and education (45.5%) problems were more likely to report
gains in knowledge than those with other problem types. Those with owned housing
(71.4%) and consumer (58.8%) problems were most likely to report the same level of
knowledge across waves. Those with rented housing (34.6%) and personal injury (33.3%)
problems reported a loss in knowledge more frequently than those with other problem
types.
Analysis of verbatim responses demonstrated a number of response types, most
common of these were responses in which individuals were able to give a brief overview
of their rights/legal position. However, response types varied from those who supported
their answer with reference to the relevant legislation to those who simply stated their
rights. In respect of this latter group, although their answer appeared correct in relation to
their dispute, it was not possible to deduce the basis of their knowledge, i.e. whether it
stemmed from an understanding of the legislation, or whether it was based on a common
sense position as found by Kim (1999), Meager et al., (2002), Barlow et al. (2004) and
Pleasence and Balmer (2012). Individuals also frequently reported their situation or the
outcome of the dispute rather than their legal/rights and tended to also provide very vague
responses which did not appear to have specific relevance to their particular dispute. In
addition, whilst claiming to know their rights, 11.1% went on to claim they ‘didn’t know’
in relation to the question. Less frequently, 2.6% of respondents gave verbatim responses
which implied an over/under assessment of their rights. Results did not suggest any
connection between interpretation of or response to the verbatim question and level of
educational attainment.
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Who knows what and when?
In keeping with our first hypothesis, most individuals did not have knowledge of their
rights to begin with. These findings are not surprising and are in line with the findings of
previous studies, notably that of Buck et al., (2008), Denvir et al., (2012), Parle/IARS
(2009) and Casebourne et al. (2006). As also hypothesised, the majority (60.7%) of
respondents who reported a lack of knowledge at the outset of the problem did not go on to
acquire knowledge of their rights to the standard of ‘completely’ or ‘mostly’.
As found by Kim (1999) and Meager et al., (2002) and in keeping with our second
hypothesis, we found that the rate of existing knowledge and acquisition of knowledge
varied by problem type. Interestingly, many of the problem types for which knowledge was
poor at the outset, were related to social exclusion and vulnerability, including rented
housing, money, debt, benefits, education and domestic violence as has been noted by both
Buck et al. (2005, 2008), Balmer et al., (2010) and Denvir et al., (2012). This may be
related to the complexity of the problem, or potentially the low rate at which individuals
with these problem types seek professional advice (see further Pleasence et al., 2011, p.
43). This would also explain why individuals with divorce and owned housing problems
were more likely to acquire knowledge of their rights since these are problem types for
which the obtaining of professional advice is far more common (Pleasence et al.’s 2011,
p. 43).
In keeping with our third hypothesis, based on Deming’s (1950) and Groves et al.’s
(2009) concerns regarding issues of memory recall in relation to self-assessed questions, we
found that those who self-reported knowing their rights in Wave 1 of the CSJPS in respect of a
particular problem, frequently answered inconsistently when asked whether they knew their
rights in Wave 2 (in relation to the same problem). However, more often people professed to
having the same if not greater levels of knowledge in relation to their problem in Wave 2.
That reductions in levels of knowledge happened more frequently for rented housing, money
and personal injury problems may be a reflection of the complexity of dealing with such
issues or the fact that individuals tended to overestimate their knowledge of rights in relation
to these problem-types more frequently, only realising later down the line. This was certainly
the case for those with rented housing problems where 4.6% of verbatim responses
were categorised as ‘(3) Potential Error’, the third highest of any other problem
group. Interestingly, those with money problems tended towards answering the verbatim
question by explaining their ‘(1) situation/outcome’ than those with other problem types and
those with personal injury problems tended to report their rights as ‘(4) Value judgements’
than other problem types. The fact that they did not answer the verbatim question in the
expected manner and the fact that they answered in it a way that suggested they lacked
knowledge of their rights, may account for why by Wave 2 they had lowered their self-
reported levels of knowledge. Whilst these results highlight how self-assessed knowledge
changes over time, neither comparison between waves nor alteration of our question (to ask
participants about both their existing and acquired knowledge) can wholly negate the
continued issue of memory-recall noted by Deming (1950) and Groves et al., (2009).
Consistent with our fourth hypothesis that many of the people who profess to have
knowledge of rights will be unable to articulate these rights in response to the open-ended
format, we found that 11.1% of respondents were not able to articulate their rights/legal
position when asked to do so. However, a number of other verbatim response types
suggested that individuals had a lack of understanding of their rights. We would contend
that this was the case in respect of those 58% of respondents who when asked to explain
their rights/legal position instead gave a summary of their problem or its outcome, tended
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to over- or under-estimate their rights, gave a value judgement, mentioned non-specific
rights or claimed to have no rights. Yet, although it suggests as much, we cannot
conclusively state (contrary to their self-reporting) that these individuals did not know
their specific rights in relation to the problem. Whilst on the face of it such responses imply
if not a lack of knowledge of rights/legal position, a lack of understanding of what is meant
by the term ‘rights’/’legal position’, these responses may simply be indicative of
participants interpreting the question differently than anticipated although we would not
expect this to be the case for the entire 58% of respondents who did not answer the open-
ended question as anticipated. What we did not find was any evidence to support Geer’s
(1988) assertion that response types would vary by education level. Although verbatim
responses did vary, it did not appear that education was associated with any clear pattern of
response or non-response as Geer (1988) suggests.
What do open-ended questions tell us?
Our results support the proposition that an open-ended question approach to exploring
knowledge of rights yields insight into knowledge not acquired by other formats. Unlike
hypothetical questions, asking individuals to describe their rights/legal position in their
own words gives insight into the knowledge driving their resolution of the problem. The
fact that individuals who answered the fixed-choice self-assessment question often then
failed to answer the open-ended question (by claiming they ‘don’t know’) highlights, as
proposed by Schuman and Presser (1981) and Schwarz and Hippler (1991), the tendency
of individuals to answer self-assessed/fixed-choice questions with greater confidence/-
frequency than open-ended questions. However, the findings detailed above also suggest
that the utility of an open-ended question format in the context of a large-scale quantitative
survey will remain constrained by difficulty reconciling articulation and interpretation
with actual knowledge. Whilst this problem could be avoided through the use of vignettes
it would be difficult to do so with real problems. Although the open-ended question
enabled individuals to answer freely, as has been previously noted (Geer 1988) it also
enabled them to freely interpret the question. There was also some evidence, as
Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) note in relation to fact-based questions, of individuals
providing attitudinal responses rather than directly answering the question, as evidenced
by those who provided a value judgment/claimed ‘no rights’ in response to the open-ended
question. While nearly half of respondents were able to articulate their rights/legal
position and interpreted the question as anticipated, there was a limit to the extent to which
responses provided clear insight. For example, whilst some individuals referenced the
relevant legislation, most did not. Respondents may have been relying on ‘common sense’
when reporting what they believed to be their rights rather than an actual understanding of
the law as found by Meager et al., (2002), Barlow et al. (2004) and Kim (1999).
Conversely, others may have provided an explanation of the situation, even though they
did have a clear understanding of their rights. Thus, as found in respect of self-assessed,
fact based, and hypothetical questions, an open-ended question is not in itself capable of
providing conclusive insight into public knowledge of rights.
Policy implications
Studies seeking to acquire an understanding of the extent to which the public know their
rights, will tend to produce an inflated rate of knowledge where they rely on the public’s
self-assessment alone. As our results highlight, asking individuals whether they knew or
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acquired knowledge of their rights yields a greater number of individuals saying yes than
those capable of articulating these rights. Similarly, approaches relying on tests of
knowledge may just reflect the extent to which respondents guess correctly, rather than
reflecting any real knowledge. Including an open-ended question provides some degree of
verification, however, in order to determine whether the open-ended responses given
derive from knowledge of the law, a further question must be asked, designed to determine
how the individual knew their rights. Based on both of the aforementioned considerations,
a more nuanced question or series of questions would need to deduce not only what
individuals thought their rights to be, but also how they arrived at this conclusion. This
may involve a number of prompted open-ended questions that do not fit as readily within a
quantitative survey format and may be more appropriate within the context of a qualitative
study.
Whilst we would caution against concluding that most people were unable to articulate
their rights simply because the answer they provided was not what was anticipated
(particularly where this answer fell into the ‘(1) situation/outcome’ category) nonetheless
our results suggest some priorities for the development of public legal education. In
particular, we note that individuals most often appeared unable to articulate their rights in
respect of debt, benefits and education problems. Whilst this may be indicative of the
complexity of the problem itself or the capacity of the individual, if we are to assume that
knowledge and articulation of knowledge of rights plays a key role in problem resolution,
then public legal education may have a role to play in improving knowledge in these areas.
In addition, individuals more frequently claimed to have ‘no rights’ in respect of
employment and education problems than in respect of other problem types. Rather than a
misinterpretation of the question, such responses appear to be indicative of feelings of
disempowerment that may stem, not from a lack of knowledge of rights but rather a sense
of powerlessness arising from the inequality of the parties. The perceived ‘impotence’ of
these rights suggests the need to consider legislative rather than educational intervention/s.
In contrast, those reporting ‘vague rights’ (neighbours, owned housing, clinical negligence
and domestic violence) may benefit from a more specific understanding of the problem as
it relates to their rights. The same is also true of consumer, employment, education and
rented housing disputes, where over/underestimation of rights occurred most frequently.
When considering family issues (divorce/relationship breakdown and domestic
violence) in comparison to the remaining civil justice issues, individuals did tend to
provide verbatim responses which were indicative of the fact that they knew and could
articulate their rights. If this (and the more frequent acquisition of knowledge for family
law problems) is related to their obtaining of professional advice as noted above, any
reduction in the availability of advice is likely to have an impact on the extent to which
those with family law problems report knowing their rights in the future. Given that family
law is one area where legal aid is set to be substantially curtailed, it suggests an ongoing
and long-term role for PLE in buffering the impact of legal aid reform.
Yet in spite of what appears to be continued need for PLE and whilst simultaneously
promoting self-help for the range of problems soon to be out of the scope of legal aid, the
Government has imposed upon itself no duty to promote knowledge of rights, develop
just-in-time legal information, share the third sector’s burden of equipping citizens to
better handle their problems alone or for that matter, inform itself as to the need for public
legal education interventions (see further Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of
Offenders Act 2012, s 1(3)15). Whilst an expectation that the public takes greater
responsibility for their legal problems should be complimented with the tools to enable
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them to do so, thus far it remains to be seen who will take responsibility for both the
research underpinning and the development of PLE.
Future research
In this study we have used the articulation of rights as a proxy for actual knowledge.
Although we recognise that during the course of a dispute some individuals will never
have to put into ‘legal terms’ the rights they feel have been infringed, our results provide
new insight into how the public articulate their rights and whether open-ended questions
might produce more reliable data. Nonetheless, further research utilising different
methodologies is needed in order to more reliably determine how well individuals know
their rights and, crucially, the role knowledge plays in the resolution of civil and social
justice problems. Our assumption remains that knowledge of rights leads to ‘better’
problem-resolution, but there is little reliable evidence to support this assumption and
continued difficulty in measuring outcomes. If we are to assume that individuals will in
future be required to handle more of their civil and social justice problems alone, it is clear
that PLE will continue to have a role to play in access to justice. But whether this role
should be to improve knowledge, build confidence, promote early action or a combination
of these objectives, cannot be fully understood without further enquiry.
Notes
1. Other key rationales in determining what would and would not remain in scope, included:
i. The importance of the issue (including personal choices)
ii. The litigant’s ability to present their own case (including the venue before which the case is
heard, the likely vulnerability of the litigant and the complexity of the law)
iii. The availability of alternative sources of funding
iv. The availability of alternative routes to resolving the issue
v. The need to fulfil our domestic and international legal obligations (including those under
the European Convention on Human Rights).
2. Civil Justice problems can also be referred to as ‘justiciable’, ‘legal-related’ or ‘rights’
problems, or ‘problems with a legal dimension’. They are everyday and common-place
problems that may or may not be resolved through the civil justice system. Examples of such
problems are listed in Table 1.
3. PLE has been used to refer to both ‘legal rights-based education’ intended to promote general
public awareness of the law and legal system and ‘self-help/just-in-time’ initiatives aimed at
guiding people through the resolution of a particular problem and the legal rights it engages
(Giddings and Robertson 2003; Lawler et al, 2009). Rights-based education has included the
introduction of compulsory citizenship classes within the school curriculum since 2005 and
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) support of Public Legal Education (PLE) initiatives through the part
funding of the Public Legal Education Network (PLEnet) (PLEAS Taskforce 2007). Efforts to
provide self-help/just-in-time resources have not been centrally coordinated, but have included
the publication of a number of information leaflets available online and in person from a range
of agencies including public and third sector organisations (e.g. Shelter, Citizens Advice,
Money Advice Trust and government affiliated websites, including the Office of Fair Trading
and the now defunct Community Legal Advice, DirectGov and National Debtline to name but a
few).
4. This was particularly so in respect of discrimination-like actions which at the time did not fall
under discrimination legislation, but which would have fallen under unfair dismissal, including
dismissal on the grounds of sexual orientation and age.
5. For policy makers, this is perhaps not a pressing concern where ethical/social norms continue
to align, but does suggest that where the law changes, those people deemed to ‘have
knowledge’ may not necessarily hold contemporaneous views any more.
6. In addition, one wonders whether the questions asked of Kim’s (1999) respondents were those
which individuals could reasonably have been expected to know. An example included a
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question which asked whether it was lawful to fire an employee as retaliation for refusing to
participate in an illegal billing practice. Whilst the practice was lawful in New York
(as opposed to the other two states where the study took place), for New York respondents to
have known this would have required a detailed understanding of appeal court case law (Kim
1999, p. 469). Knowing the law in respect of rather obscure (and less likely) dismissal-at-will
circumstances is arguably less of an imperative than providing a correct gauge of public
knowledge relating to more likely dismissal-at-will events.
7. These situations included a woman’s request for financial support post-relationship
breakdown, a woman’s entitlement to inheritance upon the death of her partner and an
unmarried father’s right to make decisions regarding medical treatment of his biological child
vies-a-vie his rights as a married man.
8. The idea that couples accrued greater rights as time went on.
9. The CSJPS is a substantially developed form of Genn’s (1999) Landmark ‘Paths to Justice’
Survey.
10. So, where an individual provided a response that could have been coded as (1) or (4) for
example in relation to an employment problem they said ‘I was in the right, I had been a good
employee for over four years and I was then fired’ they were coded as (1) because their
explanation of the outcome of the case was longer than their (4) value judgement.
11. For nine problems respondents refused to give an answer (0.5%).
12. We also fitted two binary logistic regression models in order to predict the likelihood of
respondents reporting knowledge of their rights from the outset (Model 1) or later gaining
knowledge of their rights (Model 2) by problem-type whilst controlling for a range of socio-
demographic characteristics (age, academic qualifications, gender, tenure, family type,
illness/disability, mental health, ethnicity and income). Results yielded similar findings to
those detailed in Table 2. Readers wishing to know more about these models should contact the
authors.
13. For purchases made in England and Wales, with purchases from sellers within the EU protected
by the European Union Distance Selling Directive 97/7/EC.
14. Even when splitting education level into a binary ‘education qualification’ and ‘no educational
qualifications’ category, no significant pattern emerged to suggest that education level had any
role to play in type of verbatim response given.
15. Note in particular, the wording used in Section 1(3) of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, where it says ‘The Lord Chancellor may secure the
provision of— (a) general information about the law and the legal system, and (b) information
about the availability of advice about, and assistance in connection with, the law and the legal
system.
This is a departure from the legal services envisaged under the Access to Justice Act 1999
which by virtue of s4 (1) stated that ‘(a) the provision of general information about the law
and legal system and the availability of legal services’ was responsibility of the Legal
Services Commission and the Community Legal Service.
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